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Abstract 
This paper ascertain the effect of changes in the domestic interest rate on exchange rate 
movement, using monthly data from a set of emerging market economies. The central 
banks are responding to the exchange rate movements in addition to the other core 
variables, namely, inflation gap and the output gap. In addition, countries with a high 
degree of financial openness are more responsive to the movement in the exchange rate, 
but this has weakened the effectiveness of disinflationary policy. Policy makers should 
behave pre-emptive and necessitate the exchange rate adjustment as alternative policy 
choice, in the calculus of formulating policy rule.  
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Economies 
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1. Introduction 
An open economy version of IS-LM mode theoretically proves that monetary policy is 
a more potent stabilization tool in the flexible exchange rate regime for either the case 
of imperfect or perfect capital mobility. Under the assumption of an endogenous supply 
of money, New Keynesian economics have adopted the current popular assumptions 
that the central bank should use interest rate to respond to the deviation of inflation 
from its target values and the deviation of outputs from their long run values through 
Taylor (1993) rule. As the policy makers are not able to control inflation rate directly, 
they will utilize interest rate to adjust the rate of inflation. As the policy maker is 
assumed to be pre-emptive on these issues, especially under a flexible inflation 
targeting (IT) framework, this conventional optimal policy rule has been extended in 
the effort to include alternative policy choice–exchange rate. The extension of this 
monetary rule in an attempt to thin out the fluctuation of output, the gap between 
inflation and its target level and the fluctuation of the exchange rate.  
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The roles of IT and fluctuation in the exchange rate are still a puzzle in the empirical 
study. The issue of the fear-to-float phenomenon and external shocks into domestic 
inflation has prompted one question. It is interesting to find out whether the fear of 
floating has prohibited other countries to adopt IT monetary regime. The empirical 
research in this regard is still limited. Several studies (e.g. Akyurek & Kutan, 2008; 
Aizenman et al., 2011; Frömmel et al., 2011; Garcia et al., 2011) have taken into 
account the role of real exchange rate in setting the interest rate. By concentrating on a 
group of emerging market economies, Aizenman et al. (2011) contend the central bank 
responses to real exchange rate is more apparent in IT than the non-IT members. On 
the contrary, Poon and Lee (2014) find both IT (Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand) and non-targeters (Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Singapore 
and Vietnam) response relatively fast to reduce real gross domestic product and in 
dampening inflation. However, the non-IT members adopt mixed strategy as they found 
both inflation and real exchange rate provide important information in determining the 
policy rate.  
 
We depart from the previous studies by focus on 25 emerging market economies in a 
panel setting with breaks. The motivation of this paper is to ascertain the effect of 
changes in the domestic interest rate on exchange rate. Besides that, it also investigates 
the effects of whether the fear of floating has prohibited other countries to adopt IT 
monetary regime. The knowledge on whether the monetary policy is grounded on the 
inflation, output gap or exchange rate is crucial for the public as well as private investors 
to form their expectation.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
methodology deployed in this study. Data of the study and empirical results are 
discussed in section 3. Section 4 provides a further discussion on the empirical results. 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Estimation Strategy 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Following Taylor (2000), Mishkin and Savastano (2001) amongst others, and the 
objective of pre-emptive strategy, the underlying workhorse monetary policy reaction 
function for open economies presented as:  
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where ir
 
is the rate of short-term nominal interest target which set by the central bank, 
p
 
is denoted as consumer price index inflation rate, y
 
is real output, y  is potential 
output, *ir  
is equilibrium real interest rate, rer  is the real exchange rate changes, and 
x  refers to other control variables at i=1,2,…N and t=1,2,…T. The trend target rate is 
estimated by Hodrick-Prescott filter to the inflation rates and industrial production 
volume index, respectively. The expected sign for the parameters 2 , 3 , 4  and 5  in 
Eq. 1 is expected to be positive.  
2.2 Dynamic Heterogenous Panel  
Following Pesaran et al. (1999), the unrestricted specification for the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model used in this study can be written as:
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where itir  is a scalar of interest rate, i is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, 'i  
is the k  1 vector of coefficients on the explanatory variables we 
mentioned before, itX  is k  1 vector of regressors for group i, ij  are scalar coefficient 
on lagged first-differences of the interest rate, ij  are k  1 coefficient vectors on first-
difference of explanatory variables and their lagged values, i  represent the fixed 
effects, with the assumptions that the disturbances itu  are independently distributed 
across i and t, with zero means and variances 02 i . There exists an overwhelming 
evidence relationship between itir  and itX  if 0i  for all i as: 
,' ititiit Xir                                                                                                             (3) 
where is the iii 
''  is k1 vector of the long run coefficients, and it ’s are stationary 
with possibly non-zero means (including fixed effects) and can be then expressed as: 
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where i  is the coefficient error correction term measures the speed of adjustment 
towards the long run equilibrium. The error correction coefficient is expected to carry 
a statistically significant negative sign if the variables return to long run equilibrium. If 
0i , then there would no long run relationship amongst the variables.  
An advantage of pooled mean group (PMG, Pesaran et al., 1999) is that it allows the 
short-run dynamic specification to differ from country to country. The PMG estimator 
restricts the long run coefficient to be identical across groups, simply allows the short-
run and adjustment coefficient as the error variances to differ across the cross-sectional 
dimension. The group-specific short-run coefficients and the common long run 
coefficient are computed by pooling maximum likelihood estimation. For robust 
checks, the Hausman test is utilized to test the hypothesis of homogeneity of long run 
parameters. In addition, lag order is chosen based on model selection criteria.  
3. Results and Discussion 
This paper applied the monthly data from 1986: M1 to 2013: M2. The sample countries 
consisted of 25 emerging market economies (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Peru, the 
Philippines, Romania, Turkey, China, Egypt, India, Russia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Taiwan) has complete data for the empirical 
study. The series for nominal interest rate, consumer price index (CPI, 2005=100), 
industrial production volume index (IPI, 2005=100), bilateral exchange rate were 
drawn from International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for macroeconomic variables used in this 
paper. The variables of interest are all positively correlations with the domestic interest 
rate. This correlation analysis appeared to have confirmed the expected sign in the 
empirical literature. Following Pesaran (2004), the variables were pretested by testing 
the null hypothesis of the no cross-sectional dependence against the alternative of cross-
sectional dependence. The results are displayed in Table 2, column two. Our test 
statistics are significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting a high degree of cross-
sectional dependence among the panel members. The result from PCD, Pesaran’s 
(2007) cross-section augmented Im, Pesaran and Shin (CIPS) suggesting that all the 
series in the present model are stationary—I(0) except for the foreign real interest rate.  
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[Insert Tables 1 & 2] 
The Quandt-Andrews structural breakpoint test was first performed to determine the 
structural alteration in the subset of the parameters. All the statistics (Sup/MaxF, ExpF 
and AveF) reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks within the 15 percent 
trimmed data at 1 percent significance level. The strong evidence of break prompted 
this study to consider a different break date for the set of countries with the location of 
the date. The historical events in the late 1990s and 2000s had significant impacts on 
the responsive monetary policy in the developed and emerging countries. The extreme 
of the events varied from one country to another, depending on the response of these 
countries to the episodes.  
The analysis was divided into countries with low exchange rate stability (column 1, 
Table 3), countries with high degree of monetary independence (column 2), countries 
with high degree of openness (column 3), and countries with low degree of financial 
openness (column 4). The classifications of the country characteristics are based on the 
Trilemma index proposed by Aizenman et al. (2015). We took into account the model 
with breaks in the late 1990s and 2000s. The break date (DummyQ-A) is highly 
significant with a negative sign. 
[Insert Table 3] 
All the long run parameters carry a positive sign and are significant at 1 percent. These 
findings are consistent with Taylor’s rule that a tight monetary policy reduces 
inflationary pressure, suggesting a high interest rate when there is high inflation or 
when the output is above its full-employment level. Additionally, a Wald test for 
inflation gap and output gap equal to 0.50 is rejected at the 1 percent significant level. 
Given the coefficient on the inflation gap and the output gap are significant difference 
from 0.50, the results indicate that the central banks do not follow a strict anti-
inflationary monetary policy.1  
 
These results suggest that countries under review adopted mixed strategy as the 
inflation, output and real exchange rate significantly determine the movement of 
                                                          
1 Soon (2015) in her thesis found the response of the policy maker is indifference between the monetary 
policy framework. 
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interest rate in the long run. The findings also support the idea that the exchange rate is 
an important part of the monetary transmission mechanism in an open economy 
(Leitemo & Söderström, 2005) and that central banks can consider external variable—
exchange rate—in setting the interest rate (Aizenman et al., 2011; Frömmel et al., 2011; 
Garcia et al., 2011; Leitemo & Söderström, 2005; Lubik & Schorfheide, 2007).  
In addition, we found the countries (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, Mexico) are 
more responsive to the movement in the exchange rate with a high degree of financial 
openness and integration (coefficient=0.241). On the contrary, the coefficient on the 
exchange rate is very small (coefficient=0.020) for the countries with low financial 
openness. These imply that the exchange rate has to be taken into account in open 
emerging market economies.  
 
Column 2 focuses on the group with high monetary independence. The insignificant 
foreign interest rate has been expected. When the degree of monetary independence is 
higher, the central banks no longer respond to the foreign rate. The speed of adjustment 
is faster in the less open emerging economies with the upper bound around 8.69 months. 
This finding indicates that the disinflationary policy is more effective in the countries 
with lower degree of financial openness. The effectiveness is followed by the countries 
with high monetary independence, with a half-life estimate upper bound around 9.57 
months. However, the countries with high financial openness and those with low 
exchange rate stability that explored themselves more in the open economies were 
found to be less effective in conducting policy. Hence, the results of this study suggest 
that the countries should increase their monetary independence and make their 
exchange rate stable.                         
 
5. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to ascertain the effects of the changes in the 
exchange rate movement on the domestic interest rate for a set of emerging markets 
economies. The major remarks may be summed up as follows. The current results 
intend to support the idea that the exchange rate is an important part of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in an open economy. One of the issues that has emerged from 
the findings is that both members adopted the mixed strategy as the inflation gap, output 
gap and real exchange rate significantly determined the movement of interest rate 
7 
(divine coincidence). Our finding goes well with the Taylor’s rule that a tight monetary 
policy is necessary to reduce inflationary pressure. The central banks are more 
responsive to the movement in the exchange rate with a high degree of financial 
openness relative to the countries with high monetary independence. The 
disinflationary policy is more effective in the countries with lower degree of financial 
openness. Policy makers should behave pre-emptive and necessitate the exchange rate 
adjustment as alternative policy choice, in the calculus of formulating policy rule.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Full sample (N=30; N x T= 8,046 observations) 
ir  2.383 2.345 11.793 -4.605 1.147 0.799 11.637 
  0.779 0.361 431.749 -262.467 8.031 16.291 1284.035 
)(    -0.021 -0.024 424.158 -260.619 7.742 16.825 1398.377 
)( yy   0.009 0.469 42.090 -84.638 7.196 -1.461 15.731 
*rir  1.602 1.660 3.298 0.212 0.475 -0.287 3.131 
rer  -0.020 -0.101 267.707 -170.863 6.399 8.165 590.887 
Correlation matrix 
 ir    )(    )( yy   *rir  rer   
ir  1.000       
  0.153 1.000      
)(    0.023 0.973 1.000     
)( yy   0.008 0.004 0.007 1.000    
*rir  0.266 -0.001 -0.022 0.069 1.000   
rer  0.015 -0.590 -0.603 -0.003 0.020 1.000  
Note: ir ,  , )(   , )( yy , *rir , rer , and rer  refer to nominal interest rate, inflation, inflation 
gap, output gap, foreign real interest rate, and real exchange rate changes, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pesaran Cross-Sectional Dependence (PCD) Test and  
Panel Unit-Root Tests 
 
PCD 
ijˆ  
  Hadri 
Z-stat 
Consistent 
Z-stat 
CIPS-stat 
ir  225.66 [0.000] 0.639   48.548a 48.650a -8.171a 
      15.594a 16.408a -6.644a 
  35.38 [0.000] 0.120   10.764a 22.046a -23.019a 
      5.816a 18.537a -23.476a 
)(  
 
13.58 [0.000] 0.077   -5.105 -4.757 -25.672a 
     -5.104 -3.862 -25.748a 
)( yy   64.84 [0.000] 0.253   -5.110 -5.019 -25.264a 
      -5.121 -4.798 -25.066a 
rer  50.38 [0.000] 0.149   1.152 1.986b -26.483a 
      1.952b 3.402a -26.792a 
Notes: (a), and (b) indicate significance at 1 and 5% levels, respectively. The PCD test is based on the residual 
cross-correlation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (p) regressions, where p denotes the lag. The test follows 
a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence. The null for Hadri’s 
test is stationary. Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel.  and  refers to 
specification with trend and without trend, respectively.  
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Table 3: Taylor Rule and Country Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Low Exchange Rate 
Stability 
High Monetary 
Independence 
High Financial 
Openness  
Low Financial  
Openness 
Long run coefficients 
*rir  0.220
a (0.049) 0.137 (0.130) 0.298b (0.133) 0.169a (0.037) 
)(    0.225a (0.027) 0.345a (0.114) 0.609a (0.102) 0.111a (0.023) 
)( yy   0.038a (0.005) 0.057a (0.018) 0.078a (0.017) 0.018a (0.003) 
rer  0.071a (0.010) 0.134 (0.127) 0.241a (0.043) 0.020a (0.007) 
Short run coefficients 
*rir  -0.031 (0.028) -0.053 (0.043) -0.046 (0.049) -0.005 (0.008) 
)(    -0.036 (0.032) -0.053 (0.048) -0.062 (0.058) -0.006b (0.003) 
)( yy  -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001b (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
rer2  -0.030 (0.029) -0.048 (0.047) -0.054 (0.052) 0.001 (0.001) 
Constant 0.148a (0.037) 0.185b (0.076) 0.045c (0.026) 0.259a (0.082) 
DummyQ-A -0.077a (0.025) -0.098b (0.039) -0.034c (0.020) -0.083c (0.050) 
Diagnostic Checking 
No. of obs. 5657 4340 2999 3557 
No. of 
countries 
 
21 
 
16 
 
12 
 
13 
LogL 5860.458 5275.463 2890.036 4307.652 
Hausman test PMG MG PMG PMG 
Convergence 
coefficient 
 
-0.055a 
 
(0.011) 
 
-0.083a 
 
(0.022) 
 
-0.027a 
 
(0.010) 
 
-0.092a 
 
(0.028) 
Note: (a), (b) and (c) indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
